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This paper develops a self-enforcing contract model 
to show that better economic fundamentals can help 
when there is weak rule of law—but with order—to 
attract foreign direct investment, whereas lowering taxes 
does not necessarily help. Using a cross-region Chinese 
dataset, the analysis finds evidence consistent with the 
theoretical analysis. Regional variations in tax rates and 
the perceived quality of formal contracting institutions 
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are not correlated with regional inflows of foreign direct 
investment, but leadership characteristics are. Most 
conventional economic factors have the predicted effects 
on foreign direct investment. The finding that foreign 
direct investment is lower in locations where domestic 
private firms have better access to finance and where the 
air quality is poor is new to the literature. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
China is known for its lack of rule of law and weak property rights institutions (Allen, 
Qian, and Qian 2005). Nevertheless, China has become the world‟s number one destination for 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and that, at least to some observers, is puzzling (Fan, Morck, Xu 
and Yeung, 2007). It is true that China is a big country, and its number one position in the total 
amount of FDI is less surprising once it is divided by 1.3 billion people. However, such a simple 
division overlooks the great disparities in FDI across Chinese regions. To be more precise, for 
the 916 Chinese districts
2 in the data  sample used in this paper, the average share of foreign 
equity ownership is 0 for the bottom quarter  of districts, the median is 6 percent,  for the 90th 
percentile it is one-third, and the highest share is 100 percent . In other words, some Chinese 
districts have a very high FDI  presence that may be comparable to developed countries. What 
explains these vast variations? If the rule of law is fundamental to FDI, and given the fact that no 
Chinese localities have a legal institution remotely close to th ose in developed countries, what 
explains the high FDI in these localities?  
According to  Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), China is a counterexample to the recent 
literature that links a country‟s financial development and hence its economic growth to its legal 
system, especially property rights protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998; 
Levine, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Moenius and Berkowitz, 2010). We 
concur with Allen, Qian and Qian in the sense that the rule of law and a formal system of 
property rights are apparently not the most essential institutions in explaining FDI inflows within 
Chinese regions, and that the law and finance literature has overlooked the power of informal 
                                                 
2 District is the administrative level just below city. In many cases, these districts have the same official rank as a 
county.     3 
institutions, particularly the mechanism of reputation that has been well studied in the repeated 
games literature (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).   
Conventional literature on what drives FDI normally ignores  the legal/property rights 
institutions  and  looks  only  at  economic  factors  behind  FDI  decisions.  In  contrast,  the  cross 
country studies of FDI that take institutional factors into account add property rights institutions 
in an ad hoc way as one of the explanatory variables along with other conventional variables on 
FDI. Both treatments are not entirely satisfactory. In a country where there is a total lack of 
property rights protection, very few companies would want to invest in that country even if it 
may enjoy large market size, low labor cost and good geography. All these advantages can be 
taken  away  by  the  grabbing  hand  of  the  host  government.  Therefore,  what  determines  FDI 
inflows in a weak legal environment is not straightforward without rigorous analysis supported 
by careful empirical analysis. Indeed, if legal institutions are indispensable to FDI, then there 
should not  be  as  much regional disparity in  FDI  as  we have observed  in  China (and likely 
elsewhere).  
In this paper, we first construct a simple self-enforcing contract model to analyze the 
possibility and determinants of FDI in the absence of the rule of law.
3 We then use a large new 
data set of firm ownership and business environment from a survey conducted by the World 
Bank and the National Bureau of Statistics in China to study what determines regional variations 
of FDI in China. Besides the conventional factors that have traditionally been linked to FDI, we 
will pay particular attention to many less studied factors. 
In addition to  the  literature  already  mentioned, our paper is closely related to three 
strands of literature on the determinants of FDI inflow. The first is the surging new literature on 
                                                 
3 There is a difference between the lack of order (or chaos) and the absence of rule of law. China does not have the 
rule of law but clearly has order. We thank Yingyi Qian, the editor, for pointing this out to us.   4 
the relationship between institutions and FDI inflow in particular and economic outcomes in 
general.  The  literature  employing  cross-country  sample  to  study  FDI  has  found  that  key 
determinants on FDI inflow or effects includes institutional quality and corruption (Wei, 2000; 
Javorcik and Wei, 2002; Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005; Stein and Daude, 2007; Alfaro, 
Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych, 2008). However, Fan et al. (2009) no longer finds institutions 
to be robustly related to FDI per capita once one controls for economic track record.   
The second strand of literature includes studies on the geographical distribution of FDI in 
the U.S. or other developed countries and studies on the location of FDI from the U.S. or other 
developed countries to  developing countries. Blonigen (2005) offers a nice summary of this 
empirical  literature  across  countries.  A  more  relevant  part  of  this  strand  of  literature  is  the 
literature on the determinants of FDI inflow across Chinese provinces. It points to the following 
factors  as  important:  (i)  good  infrastructure;  (ii)  a  large  market;  (iii)  ethnic  link  to  foreign 
investors.  There  is  also  evidence  about  the  importance  of  preferential  policies,  more  R&D 
manpower, or lower wage rate, but the support is considerably weaker (Head and Ries, 1996; 
Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Dees, 1998; Wei et al., 1999; Hou and Zhang, 2001; Huang and Di, 
2004; Huang, 2007). Our paper distinguishes itself from the above papers in several aspects. 
First of all, we build our empirical investigation on a theoretical analysis of what determines FDI 
inflows in the absence of the rule of law. Second, our unit of analysis is at the district level 
instead of the usual country level or province level, and this gives us a much larger sample, 
which covers 120 Chinese cities and more than 900 districts. Third, we have detailed information 
on  many  novel  factors  that  may  affect  FDI,  including  local  government  attributes,  banking 
environment, contracting institutions and the quality of living.    5 
The  third  literature  concerns  the  role  of  leadership  characteristics  and  economic 
development. This literature is sparse, with the most noticeable being Jones and Olken (2005), 
which find that national leadership quality matters significantly for growth rates. This is true 
especially in autocratic settings in which the power of leaders is less constrained. We add to this 
literature with within-country evidence in the largest non-democratic country. We confirm their 
findings, suggesting that leadership characteristics are of importance of the first order.   
The rest  of the paper is organized as  follows.  Section 2 constructs  a simple  implicit 
contract model and shows that a country with good economic fundamentals can attract FDI even 
without the rule of law, and that a location with better economic fundamentals can attract more 
FDI. Empirical implications from the model are then derived. Section 3 introduces the data,  
describes the econometric specification, defines the variables, and maps the model‟s predictions 
into relevant hypotheses. Section 4 presents the regression results, which largely confirm our 
predictions. Section 5 summarizes the main findings  and offers remarks on the role of the rule of 
law in the economic growth in transitional or developing economies.  
 
2.   A Simple Model of FDI in the Absence of the Rule of Law 
 
We model the rule of law as a government‟s ability to commit to a tax rate to be enforced 
by a third party. When the rule of law is absent, the government‟s announced tax rate is not 
enforceable by  a third  party  but  must be self-enforcing  for it to  be effective. We  adapt  the 
standard  repeated  game  model  of  self-enforcing  implicit  contracts  (Bull,  1987)  to  study  the 
interaction between a government and foreign investors in the absence of the rule of law. We 
first consider the case where there is a single location for investment. This addresses the issue of   6 
whether a country that has no rule of law can in principle draw foreign investors. We then 
consider the case with competition between two locations, and this addresses the issue of where 
foreign investors would be more likely to go within such a country. 
Consider  a  particular  location  where  the  government  and  a  foreign  investor  play  an 
infinitely repeated game. Each period, the investor has exactly one dollar to invest. Let ʱ be the 
reservation  net  after-tax  return  to  investment,  below  which  she  will  choose  to  invest  in 
somewhere else. Consider a location where the gross return to investment is 1 i   , where i 
may or may not be positive and measures the location‟s relative ability to generate high return to 
investment. With a slight abuse of notation, we use i to indicate this location.  Its government can 
tax  investors  every  period,  and  receive  a  tax  revenue.  All  the  revenue  is  consumed  by  the 
government in the period.  
In the stage game, the government announces a tax rate  i t on every dollar of investment, 
then an investor decides whether and how much to invest. After the gross return is generated, the 
government  can  honor  or  renege  on  the  announced  tax  rate.  We  treat the  government‟s 
announced tax rate as a contract with investors and consider a trigger strategy equilibrium for the 
repeated game. If the government reneges on the contract, the investor who has invested in the 
location will no longer invest in the location  in the future periods. Thus, if the government 
chooses to renege, it will choose to seize all the gross return from the investor, and will receive 
no tax  revenue from  the investor  every period after reneging.  If the  government  honors  the 
announced tax rate, it receives    from the investor for the period. The stage game is repeated in 
the  absence  of  deviation  by  the  government,  and  any  deviation  leads  to  a  reversion  to  the 
perpetual play of the stage game equilibrium, i.e., no investment.    7 
Let  ʴ  be  the  discount  factor.  The  smaller  the  discount  factor,  the  less  patient  the 
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(1) 
That is, a credible, self-enforcing tax rate must be such that                          . This 
shows that a government‟s promise of too low a tax rate is not credible. On the other hand, to 
attract investors, the tax rate, if self-enforcing, cannot be too high. Given a self-enforcing tax rate, 
an investor would invest in location i if its net after-tax return               , i.e., if  
        (2) 
For  the  above  two  inequalities  to  hold,  it  is  necessary  that                       .  After 
rearrangement, this becomes 
     
 
                                        (3) 
This condition is more likely to hold when the common discount factor is high, which means the 
government cares very much about the future, the location has a high ability to generate a return 
to  investment,  and  the  after-tax  investment  return  elsewhere  is  low.  In  other  words,  if  the 
government  sufficiently  cares  about  its  reputation  and  if  the  location  has  good  economic 
fundamentals such as good infrastructure, it may be able to commit to a tax rate that is attractive 
to investors and in the meantime the government finds it worthwhile to honor.  
Note that it is better to have the rule of law because in that case,       is sufficient to 
attract  investment.  However,  the  above  analysis  shows  that  when  condition  (3)  is  satisfied, 
investment can still come even in the absence of it. In this sense, economic fundamentals are 
more important for foreign investment in an economy that does not have the rule of law than an 
economy  that  does,  a  point  that  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Fan  et  al.  (2009)  that   8 
institutions are no longer robustly related to FDI once the analysis controls for the economic 
record of a country.   
Now we consider the case with two locations competing for the investor‟s money. If only 
one location satisfies condition (3), then this location will be able to attract investors. If both 
locations  satisfy  condition  (3),  then  which  location  would  an  investor  choose  to  invest?    It 
depends on both the tax rate and the pre-tax return on investment at each location. Suppose that i 
is p at location p and r  at location r, and that      . In other words, location r (the rich location) 
has economic advantages over location p (the poor location) that help investors generate higher 
returns to investment.  
For the government of location p, the lowest level of self-enforcing tax rate is       
                  .  Any  tax  rate  less  than  this  is  not  credible.  Let  the  chosen  tax  rate  by 
government p be   . An investor‟s net after-tax return at the location is           . Location r 
can choose a tax rate that is slightly less than                  . Given that    is self-enforcing, 
it is easily shown that    is also self-enforcing. It is a Nash  equilibrium that         ,           
       , and the investor chooses to invest in location r. Location p cannot beat the competition 
from location r by offering a much lower tax rate because such a tax rate would not be credible.  
Note that the investor actually chooses to invest in a location that has a higher tax rate, 
which is also economically advantageous. This seems counter-intuitive. To better understand the 
relationship between the tax rate and investment, it is useful to compare the cases with and 
without  the rule of law, and ask whether, other things being the same, lowering the tax rate can 
attract more investment in both cases. 
Suppose          , that is, both locations have the same economic fundamentals. If there 
is the rule of law in both locations, then the local governments can commit to any tax rate. In our   9 
model‟s setup, both locations in equilibrium will set        If a location for whatever rational or 
irrational reason plays an off-equilibrium strategy and sets a lower tax rate (for example, giving a 
subsidy to the investor), then this location will be able to attract the investment; and if it charges 
a higher tax rate, it will not be able to attract the investment. In other words, if there is the rule of 
law, then ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relationship between the tax rate and investment. In 
contrast, when both locations have no rule of law, the equilibrium tax rate would be the lowest 
self-enforcing  rate                         .  If  one  of  the  locations  charges  a  lower  off-
equilibrium tax rate, this location will not attract the investment because the lower rate is not 
credible. On the other hand, if it charges a higher tax rate, it will not attract the investment either.  
Hence, in this world of no rule of law, FDI does not respond to tax rates monotonically. 
To summarize, our theoretical analysis implies three predictions. First,  when a place has 
sufficiently good economic fundamentals (i.e., factors contributing to a higher rate of return on 
investment), it can attract FDI, and that the place that has better economic fundamentals can 
attract more investment.  Second, in the absence of the rule of law, there is no relationship 
between  the  tax  rate  and  investment.  Finally,  the  model  implies  that  if  the  leadership  of  a 
location sufficiently cares about its reputation among investors or certain characteristics make it 






3.   Data, Variables and Hypotheses   10 
3.1  The Data Set 
  The data set we use is the World-Bank-NBS Survey on 120 Chinese cities of 12,000 
firms between 2002 and 2004. In the data, all provinces in China are covered except Tibet.
4  For 
each province, the  capital city is selected, and if the province is not too small   (by  China‟s 
standard), other cities are also selected. Typically, provinces with high total GDP are allowed to 
survey  more  cities.  In  each  province,  top  cities  (as  measured  by  either  total  GDP  or  total 
industrial output) are selected. For all but four cities, we sample 100 firms; for the four mega 
cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), we sample 200 firms. Thus, we have 12,400 
sample firms in total. See Table A1 for a complete list of provinces and cities. All firms are from 
manufacturing. For each city, the top 10 manufacturing industries in terms of sales revenue are 
drawn. For each industry, all firms in the sample universe are divided into large, middle and 
small firms, each accounting for 1/3 of total industry revenue. Then from each of three types of 
firms,  an  equal  number  of  firms  are  drawn.  Firms  are  required  to  have  a  minimum  of  10 
employees. The distribution of our sample industries is displayed in Table A.2. 
  The survey has three main parts. The first part was sent to the senior managers of a firm, 
covering topics related to basic firm characteristics, bottlenecks to firms' growth, relationship 
with  clients  and  suppliers,  labor,  infrastructure,  trade,  finance,  corporate  governance  and 
relationship  with  the  government.  The  second  part  was  sent  to  the  accounts  and  personnel 
officers, concerning topics on ownership composition, financial statements and labor statistics. 
The last part is answered at the city level, covering basic characteristics of the city that a firm is 
located.  
                                                 
4 Tibet is not selected because there are insufficient number of firms.  In conventional firm surveys conducted by 
NBS, Tibet is often not selected due to high survey costs.   11 
Our unit of analysis is a district under a city administration. A district in China tends to 
be quite large—typically a large city has around 10 districts or counties, and a district can have 
as many as a million people, and there can be large variations in economic conditions and even 
the quality of government services within the same city. The sample we use for the final analysis 
includes slightly more than 900 districts.  
 
3.2   Variables and Hypotheses 
We adopt the following specification: 
                                                  
                                                                                                 (4)               
Our dependent  variable is  the extent of FDI in a district,  measured  by  the share of foreign 
ownership in a firm averaged at the district level. Since our dependent variable is a censored at 
zero and one, we employ the Tobit specification to take into consideration of censoring at both 
tails. Figure 1 shows the kernel density graph of district foreign ownership, which is heavily 
concentrated between zero and 20 percent, with a thin distribution at the 20 percent and more 
range.  
All the variables at the district level are computed based on the sample average for the 
firms in the district.
5  Table 1 contains the definitions of the variables in our analysis. We divide 
the independent variables into  several  groups. The first group FIRM  includes  two control 
variables: the district-level average of firm size (log of the number of employees) and that of the 
log of firm age.  
                                                 
5 When the number of observations for a district is too small (less than 6 firms), we use the city-average to replace 
the district average.   12 
The second group CONVENTIONAL consists of a number of conventional economic 
factors that affect business costs and market opportunities faced by foreign investors. Most of 
these factors have been routinely used in the  literature, and they affect the rate of return to 
investment (i.e., i in our model) and hence should affect FDI. One such factor is a locality‟s 
income level, measured by the log of per capita GDP at the city level. It is a proxy for local 
market opportunity for foreign invested firms. A location that has higher income is a potential 
market for relatively high end products by these firms. Other factors include (i) a geographical 
variable measured by the log of the city‟s distance to the closest port (in kilometers) plus one, (ii) 
the quality of infrastructure as measured by the log of the city‟s telephone density, (iii) the labor 
cost measured by the log of the city-level average wage, and (iv) the skill level of a location 
proxied by the district average of the share of employees that are college-educated.  
We also include in this group a quality of life variable as measured by the number of 
good air days  according to the local environmental protection bureau.
 6 The impact of the quality 
of living on FDI is a factor that has not previously been studied. Since the inflow of foreign 
capital is almost always accompanied by the movement of foreign personnel to the new locality, 
it is natural that these investors would pick a location in which the quality of living is better, 
ceteris  paribus,  to  improve  on-the-job  consumption  and  to  reduce  payment  for  hardship 
allowance. 
The  third  group  INSTITUTIONAL  consists  of  regulatory  or  institutional  factors  that 
affect the cost and opportunity for a foreign investor to do business in a particular location. The 
first factor we consider is whether a locality is designated as an „open city‟. In two waves of 
opening-up reform, in the 1980s, a number of cities were designated by the central government 
either as a „special economic zone‟ or an „open coastal city‟ (Litwack and Qian 1998; Coughlin 
                                                 
6 The environmental bureaus do use the common technical standards in judging air quality.   13 
and Segev, 2000; Chen et al., 2011). In 1980 the central government designated four cities, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, to be the special economic zones. A few years later, 
another 14  cities were  designated as  „open  coastal  cities‟. These cities were  granted special 
policy  advantages  in  attracting  FDI,  which  meant  fewer  restrictions  on  FDI  and  some  tax 
concessions  from  the  central  government.  During our sample period, the policy differentials 
across Chinese cities became much smaller. However, there may still be path-dependence effects 
or some policy advantages enjoyed by these open cities. 
The second institutional variable is custom efficiency, as proxied by the log of the district 
average number of days for export to pass customs plus the district average number of days for 
import to pass customs.
7  As a measure of the efficiency of bureaucracy, it  should be negatively 
correlated with FDI inflows. The third variable,  the share of domestic private firms in a district 
with access to bank loans, reflects the maturity of a locality‟s financial institutions. If domestic 
private firms have good access to finance, particularly bank loans, the need for foreign direct 
investment might be lower (Huang and Di, 2004; Huang, 2007). Moreover, due to diminishing 
returns to  capital,  the return to  foreign direct  investment  should  be lower in  a locality  with 
relatively more abundant capital.  
The fourth institutional factor we consider is the cost of maintaining guanxi (relationship) 
with the relevant government officials and departments. In China, maintaining guanxi means 
dining and wining, and it is costly. We therefore expect this cost to have a negative impact on 
FDI. The ratio of entertainment and travel costs (ETC) to sales is used as a proxy for the cost of 
guanxi. ETC is an expenditure item in standard accounting books of firms in China, and it is a 
large sum, amounting to about 20% of the total wage bills in the sample firms of the investment 
climate survey of the World Bank. Cai, Fang and Xu (forthcoming) find strong evidence that 
                                                 
7 The two components are closely correlated.  We bundle them together to avoid multicollinearity.   14 
ETC  likely  includes  expenditures  on  government  officials  both  as  „grease  money‟  and 
„protection money‟, expenditures to build relationship with suppliers and clients, and private 
managerial consumption. We include both the district average of private firms‟ ETC and the 
district average of foreign firms‟ advantage in ETC, which is constructed as the district average 
ETC burden for domestic private firms over district average ETC burden for foreign firms minus 
one.  
The fifth institutional factor is the perception of the contractual rights protection, and it is 
measure of what Acemouglu et al. (2005) refers to as „contracting institutions‟. Our data set 
contains information on the perception by firm managers on the effectiveness of protection of 
contractual and property rights in the event of commercial disputes. It is based on the answer to 
the following question: „Among all the commercial or other disputes related to your company, 
what is the likelihood that your legal contracts or property rights are protected.‟  This question 
reflects partly the perceived quality of the legal system in protecting contractual and property 
rights, and partly the services provided by the government because the government may also be 
involved in settling some of the disputes. Again, we consider both the average response by the 
domestic private firms and the advantage in contract enforcement enjoyed by foreign invested 
firms in a district,
8 which is constructed as the district average perception of property rights 
protection foreign invested firms over that for domestic private firms.  
A  good  „contracting  institution‟  should  in  principle  reduce  transaction  costs  among 
businesses and lower the associated risks. Lacking the rule of law, however, China as a whole 
apparently does not have a good contracting institution. But this does not make contracts useless. 
Just like the „contract‟ we modeled between the government and an investor, contracts between 
business firms can also rely on self-enforcement instead of third party enforcement. The actual 
                                                 
8 Again, when the number of observations within the district cell is too small, the city average is used instead.   15 
occurrence of a commercial dispute going to the court is an off-equilibrium event, and should be 
relatively infrequent in comparison with the number of commercial dealings. Therefore, even if 
there can be variations across cities and districts in the perception of contracting institution in the 
rare event of such disputes, the reality is that such a perception should not be a significant factor 
in determining whether and where a foreign firm will invest in China where most contracts 
between businesses rely on self-enforcement.    
Our model predicts that there is no relationship between the tax rate and FDI, and we 
therefore include in the regression two TAX variables to test this hypothesis: one is the district 
average of domestic private firms‟ tax burdens, and the other is the district average foreign 
advantage in tax burdens, which is constructed as the district average tax burden for domestic 
private firms over district average tax burden for foreign firms minus one. The tax burden at the 
firm level is the summation of all types of taxes paid by the firm over its sales.   
The  last  group  of  variables,  LEADER,  consists  of  certain  characteristics  of  local 
government leaders. In a country where there is no rule of law, there is the rule of man. In our 
model, if the government leader has a long horizon and hence cares about his or her reputation 
for  being  investor  friendly,  or  if  the  leader  pursues  investors  hard  and  is  a  persuasive  and 
credible  communicator,  then  it  is  more  likely  that  he  or  she  may  be  able  to  attract  more 
investment. Presumably, a leader who is better educated, young and more likely to be promoted 
is more likely to fit the above profile.   
Whether leadership matters in economic growth and development has been hotly debated 
among generations of thinkers (Jones and Olken, 2005). At one extreme there are people who 
argue that national leaders merely proxy the will of the people or the underlying economic forces. 
At the other extreme, there is the „great man theory‟ of history, which argues that history is   16 
largely determined by random events and the will of the great men. Taking the debate to data, 
Jones and Olken (2005) find that national leader quality has a strong causal effect on growth, 
especially in autocratic countries. In a related paper, Li and Zhou (2005) find that provincial 
leader incentives are closely related to local economic performance. 
Our leadership variables include leader tenure, leader cohorts and their interaction terms. 
The leaders are  the cities‟ party secretaries (PSs), and in China, they are the top executives and 
power-holders.
9 We classify PSs into three cohorts, (relatively) young, middle -aged, and old, 
with the top and bottom defined to be below the 25 percentile and above 75 percentile in age 
distribution. The cutoff thresholds happen to be 47 years  and 53 years old, which more or less 
partitioned PSs into those being educated before, during and after the Cultural Revolution. 
Presumably, those who were educated during the Cultural Revolution period—a period featuring 
frequent and/or complete shutdown of schools--had the worst education. We thus expect the PSs 
who were educated before and after Cultural Revolution to be better at attracting FDI. In China, 
a cadre who has the faster promotion is often the one who has had relatively shorter stints in 
more positions. Hence we expect a PS who has a shorter expected tenure at his or her position 
and hence better promotion prospect to have a longer time horizon and cares more about his or 
her reputation with the foreign investors. In a city where the previous PSs have been promoted 
relatively quickly, it is likely that the city is a place used by the upper level government as a 
training and test ground for promising cadres. Thus, the current PS of the city may expect a 
shorter  tenure  and  faster  promotion  after  showing  some  achievement.  We  measure  the  PS‟s 
expected tenure as the average of the latest three PSs. The expected tenure effect may vary with 
the age of a PS. A younger PS would presumably have a stronger career concern and care more 
about  his  or  her  reputation.  Therefore,  we  may  expect  that  the  tenure  effect  to  be  more 
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pronounced for younger PSs than for the older ones. We use the interaction term  of the tenure 
variable and the cohort dummy variable to test for the differential effect. 
 
4.   Regression Results 
While some of our key variables are measured at the more disaggregated district level, 
some others are at the city level. This introduces the possibility that the observations are not 
independent across districts of the same city. To contain the potential exaggeration of estimation 
precision, we cluster the standard errors at the city level (Moulton, 1990). 
In  column  (1)  of  Table  3,  we  present  the  district-level  analysis  the  determinants  of 
foreign ownership. In column (2) we present the marginal effect of the explanatory variable on 
foreign ownership conditional on that it is positive and non-censored. In column (3) we add city 
GDP growth rate and another proxy of infrastructure, the district average of the loss of sales due 
to electricity outage. Since the qualitative results tend to be similar, we shall focus on the results 
in column (1).   
FDI  is  higher  in  cities  with  higher  per  capita  GDP;  however,  it  is  not  statistically 
significant. A longer distance to the nearest port is weakly associated with a smaller share of 
district foreign ownership. This is to be expected: locations with a higher transportation cost are 
less attractive to foreign investors. Unsurprisingly, phone density is positively associated with 
FDI entry. Increasing phone density by one SD would increase average foreign ownership by 1 
percentage points, or 9 percent.  
Interestingly,  the  average  wage  cost  is  not  significantly  correlated  with  FDI.  This  is 
perhaps because it is simultaneously a measure of costs and of productivity, and, thus, its sign is 
hard to pin down ex ante. Indeed, the variable capturing skills of labor force, the district average   18 
share of college graduates in labor force is positive and significant. The implied magnitude, 
however, is quite small: a one-SD increase in this variable would increase foreign ownership by 
only 0.3 percentage points or 2 percent at the mean. 
Investors do seem to care about the quality of living when they decide on investment site. 
The share of days with good quality air is positively and significantly associated with district 
foreign ownership. Increasing this by one SD would increase foreign ownership by 1 percentage 
point,  or  8  percent  at  the  mean.  This  number  is  significant  enough  to  be  noticed,  but  not 
overwhelmingly important, consistent with our feeling that the quality of living is an important, 
but nevertheless not a dominant concern for international investors. 
In summary, the conventional economic factors mostly have the expected effect on FDI 
inflows. We now turn to the effects of regulatory and institutional factors.  
Firms  located  in  an  „open  city‟  attract  significantly  more  FDI,  suggesting  that 
government policies matter in attracting investment. The magnitude is also large. Relative to a 
city that is not designated as an „open city‟, a district located in an „open city‟ would feature a 
foreign ownership that is 3.2 percentage points (or 27%) higher.  
  The efficiency of bureaucracy matters too. Apparently, fewer days to pass customs would 
reduce  the  costs  of  exporting  goods  and  importing  goods,  and  increase  an  FDI  firm's 
competitiveness in the market. Indeed, reducing custom days by one standard deviation (SD) 
would  increase  district  ownership  by  3.3  percent  points,  or  28  percent  at  the  mean  foreign 
ownership. Thus, custom efficiency proves to be an important factor in attracting FDI inflow.  
  The development of financial market is an important determinant of foreign ownership. 
The share of private firms in the district with access to loans is negatively and significantly 
correlated with district foreign ownership. Reducing access to loan by domestic private firms by   19 
one SD (0.21) would increase district average foreign ownership by 1 percentage point, or 8 
percent at the mean. This finding is consistent with the idea that part of the reasons for FDI 
inflow is to use foreign capital to replace domestic capital for local development when local 
financial  market  is  poorly  developed  and  access  to  capital  is  difficult  by  domestic  private 
investors (Huang, 2007). 
The cost of maintaining guanxi has a negative impact on FDI. While the average level of 
ETC, the share of entertainment and traveling costs over sales, for domestic private firms does 
not affect FDI,  foreign advantage in ETC is associated with a higher FDI level. Thus, districts in 
which foreign firms do not have to spend too much on guanxi with government attract more 
foreign  investment.  Increasing  the  ETC  advantage  for  foreign  firms  by  one  SD  (1.08)  is 
associated with an increase in district average foreign ownership by 1.2 percentage points, or 10 
percent at the mean of foreign ownership. 
As predicted, the managerial perception of the legal protection of contractual rights by 
domestic firms and the advantage in legal contract enforcement enjoyed by foreign invested 
firms do not matter for FDI. This result is consistent not only with the spirit of our theoretical 
analysis, but also with Acemoglu and Johnson‟s (2005) finding that contracting institutions do 
not have a first-order importance in economic growth.  
  Next we turn to the two hypotheses that are unique to our model, namely the effect of the 
tax rate and leadership characteristics on FDI. First, the empirical result indeed confirms our 
theoretical prediction that tax policies are not significantly associated with FDI inflows. Neither 
district average of tax burdens for private firms nor the tax advantage of foreign firms has any 
statistically significant effect on FDI.      20 
  Second, local leadership variables also have expected effects. Specifically, the age profile 
of the party secretary is significantly related to FDI. Younger PSs are associated with a „premium‟ 
in FDI level by 2.2 percentage points,
10 or 18 percent of the mean FDI level. Older PSs are 
associated with a premium in  FDI by 5.3 percentage points, or  43 percent of the mean level. 
These effects are remarkably large. The PSs at the middle-range age graduated from high school 
roughly between 1969 and 1975, the main part of the Cultural Revolution period when education 
was particularly bad. It is not surprising that the relatively young and old PSs tend to do a better 
job than the middle-aged ones. Moreover, the effect of the average tenure of the party secretaries 
is also consistent with our hypothesis. For both relatively young and old  PSs, a shorter average 
tenure is associated with a higher  FDI level, but only the interaction term of young  PS with 
log(average PS tenure) is statistically significant . The fact that the tenure effect is especially 
pronounced for young PSs is  consistent with the idea that young leaders have a longer career 
and stronger concern for their reputation.  
We have examined the robustness of our results  with several alternative specifications. 
We have tried adding more controls in the regressions. In particular, we have tried adding GDP 
growth rate for the city and  the district-average share of sales lost  due to electricity outage 
(column 2 in Table 3 ), the logarithm of city  population (tried but unreported), and they are 
largely statistically insignificant. Our key results remain intact. 
One concern is that measuring FDI in terms of average foreign ownership  for firms in a 
region is not standard--the standard way is FDI per capita. We do not have this measure at the 
district level, so we cannot directly test whether our results would remain robust if we measure 
FDI  by FDI per capita. We do, however, have city -level FDI per capita .  The correlation 
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coefficient of city  FDI  per capita and district  average foreign ownership is  high:  0.44.  This 
should relieve our concern. 
  Another concern is that the district average foreign ownership is a simple average, which 
may  lead  to  misleading  results  if  not  weighted  by  firm  size.  To  address  this  concern,  we 
construct the district average foreign ownership using firm size (i.e., the number of employees) 
as weight. The weighted foreign ownership is closely correlated with the simple average, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.88.  Table 4 reports  the district  level regression  corresponding to 
column (1) of Table 3 but using employment size-weighted foreign share ownership of firms in a 
district as the dependent variable. The qualitative results are, not surprisingly, very similar. 
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have tried to show that the rule of law is not necessary for a country to 
attract  FDI.  In  a  self-enforcing  contract  model,  we  demonstrate  that  good  economic 
fundamentals can attract FDI inflows in the absence of the rule of law. In fact, they are more 
important for a country without the rule of law than for countries with it. The model shows that 
in such a country, a locality can attract more investment by improving economic fundamentals, 
but not by simply lowering tax rates. The model also implies that a government leader who has a 
longer-term career horizon and cares about his or her reputation may be able to attract more 
investment.   Our empirical evidence based on data from Chinese cities is largely consistent with 
the model‟s predictions.    
Our  paper  echoes  a  number  of  recent  papers  that  have  questioned  the  fundamental 
importance of the rule of law in economic growth (Qian, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2004; Rodrik, 2004; 
Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Fan et al., 2009). As we read them, these papers all argue or imply   22 
that the formal rule of law and institutional constraints on government are not always necessary 
for economic growth in a developing or transitional economy.  In particularly, using a cross-
country panel data, Fan et al. (2009) find that FDI per capita is not robustly related to the rule of 
law once the analysis controls for a country‟s economic track record and its volatility. Their 
similar findings based on cross-country panel data that are completely different from our within-
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Table 1. Definitions of Key Variables 
  Definitions 
FDI  share of foreign ownership in a firm averaged at the district level 
ln(L)  Ln(district average of the number of employees in a firm) 
ln(firm age)  Ln(district average of firm age) 
ln(GDP PC)  Ln(city-level GDP per capita evaluated at 2004 Yuan) 
ln(city distance to port +1)  Ln(City's distance to the port+1) 
City phone density  City level average number of phones per 100 people. 
ln(city average wage)  Ln(city-level average wage per employee based on city survey), wage evaluated at 
2004 Yuan. 
district average share of college 
graduate in L 
District-level share of employees with college or above education. 
City share of good air days  Share of days in the city that the quality of air reaches a specified threshold (to be 
judged as good or ok). 
dummy: open city  Dummy of initial open cities, including Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen. 
ln(days passing customs)  Ln(district-level average of the number of days for import to pass customs plus the 
number of days for export to clear customs). 
dist avg of private firm access to 
loans 
The average share of private firms with access to loans within the district. A firm is 
defined to have access to loans if it has borrowed bank loans in the past three 
years. 
dist avg of private firm ETC  The average ETC burden of domestic private firms within the district. ETC burden is 
a firm's expenditure on entertainment and traveling over sales. 
dist avg of foreign advantage in 
ETC 
District average ETC burden for domestic private firms over district average ETC 
burden for foreign firms minus one. 
dist avg of private firm contract 
enforcement 
The average of the perception of domestic private firms on the protection of 
contractual rights within the district. A firm's perception is based on the firm's 
answer to the following question: for commercial and other disputes that your 
firm has had, what is the likelihood that the company's legal contractual and 
property rights is protected?  The answer lies between 0% to 100%. 
dist avg of foreign advantage in 
contract enforcement 
District average perception of contractual rights protection for foreign firms over that 
for domestic firms. 
dist avg of private firm tax burdens  The average tax burden of domestic private firms within the district. Tax burden is 
defined as the summation of all types of taxes divided by sales. 
dist avg of foreign advantage in tax 
burdens 
District average tax burden for domestic private firms over district average tax 
burden for foreign firms minus one. 
PSyoung  A dummy variable indicating that the age of the party secretary is younger than 47 
years old (25 percentile) 
PSold  A dummy variable indicating that the age of the party  secretary  is older than 53 
years old (75 percentile) 
PS tenure  Average job tenure for the recent three party secretaries (in years) 
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 Table 2. Summary Statistics of Key Variables, Aggregated at the District level 
 
  Mean  s.d.  minimum  median  maximum 
FDI  0.120  0.170  0.000  0.061  1.000 
ln(L)  5.585  0.754  3.017  5.566  7.932 
ln (firm age)  2.276  0.366  1.298  2.251  3.929 
ln(GDP PC)  8.929  0.625  7.517  8.921  10.510 
ln(city distance to port +1)  4.846  2.215  0.000  5.583  8.313 
City phone density  3.975  0.647  2.407  3.965  5.455 
ln(city avg wage)  9.554  0.302  8.792  9.532  10. 371 
district average share of college graduate in L  0.174  0.086  0.029  0.159  0.671 
city share of good air days  0.815  0.155  0.265  0.836  1.000 
dummy: open city  0.115  0.319  0.000  0.000  1.000 
ln(dist. avg of days passing customs)  2.501  0.456  0.928  2.510  4.071 
dist avg of private firm access to loans  0.603  0.213  0.000  0.615  1.000 
dist avg of private firm ETC burdens  0.013  0.008  0.001  0.010  0.069 
dist avg of foreign advantage in ETC  0.427  1.081  -0.927  0.169  8.577 
dist avg of private firm contract enforcement  0.645  0.199  0.000  0.687  1.000 
dist avg of foreign advantage in contract enforcement  1.073  0.436  0.000  1.005  5.662 
dist avg of private firm tax burdens  0.048  0.019  0.006  0.046  0.169 
dist avg of foreign advantage in tax burden  0.169  0.742  -0.850  0.040  8.155 
average PS tenure  2.942  0.977  1.000  3.000  5.667 
ln(average PS tenure)  1.017  0.369  0.000  1.099  1.735 
PSyoung  0.262  0.440  0.000  0.000  1.000 
PSold  0.236  0.425  0.000  0.000  1.000 
ln(average PS tenure)*PSyoung  0.242  0.458  0.000  0.000  1.609 
ln(average PS tenure)*PSmiddle  0.513  0.563  0.000  0.000  1.735 
ln(average PS tenure)*PSOld  0.262  0.504  0.000  0.000  1.609 
Full foreign ownership  0.069  0.143  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Note. The statistics are at the district-level. The number of observations range from 909 to 916. 
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Table 3. Determinants of FDI at the District Level 
  (1)  marginal effects  (2) 
ln(L)  0.030***  0.015  0.031*** 
  (2.607)    (2.628) 
ln(firm age)  -0.089***  -0.043  -0.088*** 
  (-4.638)    (-4.507) 
ln(GDP PC)  0.042  0.02  0.041 
  (1.453)    (1.480) 
ln(city distance to port +1)  -0.007  -0.003  -0.007 
  (-1.531)    (-1.611) 
city phone density  0.032*  0.016  0.035* 
  (1.830)    (1.959) 
ln(city avg wage)  0.006  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.136)    (-0.062) 
dist.avg share of coll grad in L  0.243***  0.118  0.261*** 
  (3.171)    (3.433) 
city share of good air days  0.129*  0.062  0.123* 
  (1.911)    (1.828) 
dummy: open city  0.061*  0.032  0.056* 
  (1.828)    (1.654) 
ln(dist.avg of days passing customs)  -0.148***  -0.072  -0.153*** 
  (-5.365)    (-5.377) 
dist avg of priv firm access to loans  -0.100***  -0.048  -0.110*** 
  (-2.726)    (-2.889) 
dist avg of priv firm ETC  0.452  0.219  0.331 
  (0.372)    (0.279) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in ETC  0.022***  0.011  0.022*** 
  (3.281)    (3.328) 
dist avg of priv firm contract enforcement  0.037  0.018  0.038 
  (0.688)    (0.716) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in contract enforcement  -0.006  -0.003  -0.006 
  (-0.259)    (-0.272) 
dist avg of priv firm tax burdens  -0.647  -0.313  -0.677 
  (-1.270)    (-1.367) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in tax burden  0.021  0.01  0.021 
  (1.097)    (1.116) 
party secretary young  0.150**  0.082  0.155*** 
  (2.513)    (2.607) 
party secretary old  0.174**  0.099  0.175** 
  (2.066)    (2.099) 
PS young*ln(avg PS tenure)  -0.124***  -0.06  -0.124*** 
  (-2.706)    (-2.657) 
PS midde*ln(avg PS tenure)  0.027  0.013  0.030 
  (0.922)    (1.013) 
PS old*ln(avg PS tenure)  -0.095  -0.046  -0.091 
  (-1.489)    (-1.434) 
GDP growth rate, city      -0.000 
      (-0.371) 
dist avg of share of loss of sales due to elec. outage      0.272 
      (1.259) 
Observations  909    909 
Note. The standard errors are clustered at the city level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels. For marginal effects, the magnitude reported concerns about a change from 0 to 1 for a dummy explanatory variable, and 
dY/dx conditional on Y not being censored.   29 
Table 4. Determinants of FDI at the District Level: 
Dependent Variable = Foreign Ownership Weighted by Firm Size  
 
  (1) 
ln(L)  0.022 
  (1.542) 
ln(firm age)  -0.121*** 
  (-4.783) 
ln(GDP PC)  0.053 
  (1.597) 
ln(city distance to port +1)  -0.008 
  (-1.391) 
city phone density  0.045* 
  (1.891) 
ln(city avg wage)  -0.018 
  (-0.330) 
dist.avg share of coll grad in L  0.164 
  (1.554) 
city share of good air days  0.159* 
  (1.893) 
dummy: open city  0.095** 
  (2.098) 
ln(dist.avg of days passing customs)  -0.170*** 
  (-4.549) 
dist avg of priv firm access to loans  -0.141*** 
  (-3.029) 
dist avg of priv firm ETC  -0.602 
  (-0.417) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in ETC  0.034*** 
  (3.594) 
dist avg of priv firm contract enforcement  -0.020 
  (-0.325) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in contract enforcement  -0.011 
  (-0.441) 
dist avg of priv firm tax burdens  -0.611 
  (-0.871) 
dist avg of foreign advantage in tax burden  0.024 
  (0.904) 
party secretary young  0.154** 
  (2.085) 
party secretary old  0.150 
  (1.437) 
PS young*ln(avg PS tenure)  -0.145*** 
  (-2.611) 
PS middle*ln(avg PS tenure)  0.017 
  (0.393) 
PS old*ln(avg PS tenure)  -0.086 
  (-1.093) 
Observations  909 
R-squared   
Note. The standard errors are clustered at the city level. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels.   30 
                           Table A.1. The provinces and cities of our sample 
Province  City  Province  City  Province  City 
Anhui  Anqing  Henan  Luoyang  Neimenggu  Baotou 
  Chuzhou    Nanyang    Huhehaote 
  Hefei    Shangqiu  Ningxia  Wuzhong 
  Wuhu    Xinxiang    Yinchuan 
Beijing  Beijing    Xuchang  Qinghai  Xining 
Chongqing  Chongqing    Zhengzhou  Shaanxi  Baoji 
Fujian  Fuzhou    Zhoukou    Xian 
  Quanzhou  Hubei  Huanggang    Xianyang 
  Sanming    Jingmen  Shandong  Jinan 
  Xiamen    Jingzhou    Jining 
  Zhangzhou    Wuhan    Linyi 
Gansu  Lanzhou    Xiangfan    Qingdao 
  Tianshui    Xiaogan    Taian 
Guangdong  Dongguan    Yichang    Weifang 
  Foshan  Hunan  Changde    Weihai 
  Guangzhou    Changsha    Yantai 
  Huizhou    Chenzhou    Zibo 
  Jiangmen    Hengyang  Shanghai  Shanghai 
  Maoming    Yueyang  Shanxi  Datong 
  Shantou    Zhuzhou    Taiyuan 
  Shenzhen  Jiangsu  Changzhou    Yuncheng 
  Zhuhai    Lianyungang  Sichuan  Chengdu 
Guangxi  Guilin    Nanjing    Deyang 
  Liuzhou    Nantong    Leshan 
  Nanning    Suzhou    Mianyang 
Guizhou  Guiyang    Wuxi    Yibin 
  Zunyi    Xuzhou  Tianjin  Tianjin 
Hainan  Haikou    Yancheng  Xinjiang  Wulumuqi 
Hebei  Baoding    Yangzhou  Yunnan  Kunming 
  Cangzhou  Jiangxi  Ganzhou    Qujing 
  Handan    Jiujiang    Yuxi 
  Langfang    Nanchang  Zhejiang  Hangzhou 
  Qinhuangdao    Shangrao    Huzhou 
  Shijiazhuang    Yichun    Jiaxing 
  Tangshan  Jilin  Changchun    Jinhua 
  Zhangjiakou    Jilin    Ningbo 
Heilongjiang  Daqing  Liaoning  Anshan    Shaoxing 
  Haerbing    Benxi    Taizhou 
  Qiqihaer    Dalian    Wenzhou 
      Fushun     
      Jinzhou     
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               Table A.2. The distribution of sampling firms by 2-digit industries 
  Freq.  Percent 
Agricultural products and food processing  969  7.81 
Food   243  1.96 
Beverage   178  1.44 
Tobacco  46  0.37 
Textile   952  7.68 
Clothing, shoe, hat   206  1.66 
Leather, hide and feather products  139  1.12 
Timber processing and related products  141  1.14 
Furniture   55  0.44 
Paper and paper products  235  1.9 
Printing and recording media   62  0.5 
Cultural and athletic products  41  0.33 
Petroleum processing  182  1.47 
Chemical material and chemical products  1,441  11.62 
Medicine  426  3.44 
Chemical fiber   47  0.38 
Rubber   21  0.17 
Plastic products   329  2.65 
Non-metal mineral processing  1,299  10.48 
Pressing ferrous   491  3.96 
Pressing of non-ferrous  345  2.78 
Metal products   366  2.95 
General machinery   1,077  8.69 
Specific equipment   486  3.92 
Transportation equipment   989  7.98 
Electric equipment  864  6.97 
Communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment   598  4.82 
Instruments  60  0.48 
Art crafts  109  0.88 
Garbage disposal and recycling  3  0.02 
     
Total  12,400  100 
 